

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA ON ARISTOTLE'S
(COSMO-)THEOLOGY
(CLEM. *PROTREPT.* 5.66.4)

In this paper I will reconsider the doxographical text about Aristotle in Clement of Alexandria's *Protrepticus* 5.66.4:

οὐδὲν δὲ οἶμαι χαλεπὸν ἐνταῦθα γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου μνησθῆναι· καὶ ὅ γε τῆς αἰρέσεως πατήρ, τῶν ὄλων οὐ νοήσας τὸν πατέρα, τὸν καλούμενον ὕπατον ψυχὴν εἶναι τοῦ πάντος οἰεται· τούτέστι τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ψυχὴν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνων αὐτὸς αὐτῷ περιπέρεται. ὁ γὰρ τοι μέχρι τῆς σελήνης αὐτῆς διορίζων τὴν πρόνοιαν, ἔπειτα τὸν κόσμον θεὸν ἡγούμενος περιτρέπεται, τὸν ἄμοιρον θεοῦ θεὸν δογματίζων.¹

For the phrase τὸν καλούμενον ὕπατον, O. Stählin refers to '[Aristot.] *de mundo* p. 397b25; Xenocr. Fr. 18 Heinze'. For the final lines of the passage, the same author refers to E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* ii.2, p. 468 (with n. 1) and to Clement, *Stromateis* 5.14.90.3. In the latter passage, too, Clement attributes the doctrine of a limited Providence to Aristotle. E. Zeller, in the above passage of his famous handbook, explained that although Aristotle had drawn a sharp distinction between the laws for the sublunary sphere and those for the supralunary sphere, Christian and pagan opponents of Aristotle had misrepresented his position in speaking of a doctrine of limited divine Providence in Aristotle.

After Zeller, A. J. Festugière had argued in an important discussion on 'Aristote dans la littérature grecque chrétienne jusqu'à Théodoret',² that Aristotle's conception of God excluded the notion of divine Providence. Festugière had added that the broad doxographical tradition, according to which Aristotle supported a doctrine of limited Providence, was to be seen as resulting from the influence of the treatise *De mundo*, which Festugière, too, firmly believed to be pseudo-Aristotelian.³

Moreover, in a discussion on 'La Doctrine de la providence dans l'école d'Aristote', P. Moraux states: 'jamais le Stagirite ne semble avoir attribué à Dieu une activité véritablement providentielle. Dieu est bien, selon lui, le moteur suprême de l'univers, mais la pensée divine n'a d'autre objet qu'elle-même.'⁴ In Moraux's view, the doctrine of limited Providence is a 'modernization' of Aristotelian theology by Critolaus, who subsequently presented his own position as 'Aristotelian'.⁵

In what follows I want to show that the treatise *De mundo* is in fact relevant to an understanding of Clement's text, first of all to an understanding of the term ὕπατος. In doing so I want to demonstrate that Aristotle presented his own theological

¹ *Clemens Alexandrinus*, vol. i. *Protrepticus und Paedagogus*, ed. O. Stählin (GCS, Leipzig 1905, repr. Berlin 1972), pp. 50–1. *Clement of Alexandria with an English Translation*, by G. W. Butterworth (London, 1919; repr. 1960), p. 150; *Clément d'Alexandrie, le Protreptique*, introd., transl. and notes by C. Mondésert (Paris, 1949), p. 131.

² A. J. Festugière, *L'Idéal religieux des grecs et l'Évangile* (Paris, 1932), pp. 221–63. D. T. Runia took this study as his point of departure in 'Festugière Revisited: Aristotle in the Greek Patres', *VC* 43 (1989), 1–34.

³ A. J. Festugière, op. cit., pp. 225–32. Cf. id., *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, ii (Paris, 1949), p. 478. For a detailed discussion of the *De mundo*, see ibid., pp. 460–518.

⁴ P. Moraux, *D'Aristote à Bessarion: trois exposés sur l'histoire et la transmission de l'Aristotélisme grec* (Québec, 1970), p. 41.

⁵ P. Moraux, op. cit., p. 55; cf. p. 10. See also P. Moraux, 'Diogène Laërce et le Peripatos', *Elenchos* 7 (1986), 245–94, p. 281.

conception of the Unmoved Mover as being allegorically referred to in *Iliad* 8.1–22, where the phrase Ζῆν’ ὑπατον μῆστωρ’ occurs. This presents us with a hitherto unrecognized argument in favour of the authenticity of the *De mundo*. Next, I wish to argue that chapter 6 of the *De mundo* develops a position which can be understood as a doctrine of a limited divine Providence. Finally, I shall propose that in the lost works Aristotle presented God as the *entelechy* of the cosmos. This may have led to the identification of God with ‘the soul of the world’.

All this leads to a rejection of the standard view first set out by W. Jaeger, according to which the surviving treatises preserve the complete scientific philosophy of late Aristotle. Doxographical accounts such as Clement’s give support to the view that the surviving treatises should be interpreted together with and against the background of the lost works. Indeed, Clement’s statement deserves to be incorporated in the collections of fragments of lost works as a unique testimony to the close relationship between Aristotle’s theology and psychology.

A ‘HIGHEST (GOD)’

I want to start my analysis with the expression τὸν καλούμενον ‘ὑπατον’ used by Clement. In the two passages of the Aristotelian Corpus in which the term ‘ὑπατος’ occurs as a characterization of God, this term is expressly presented as a Homeric expression. In *De motu animalium* it occurs in a three-line quotation from Homer, *Iliad* 8.⁶ Homer is quoted with approval because his text can help to clarify Aristotle’s motives in arguing his theory of an unmoved principle of movement *outside* the moving universe.

The other passage in the Corpus is the text to which Stählin refers in his comment on Clement’s text, namely the much-discussed treatise *De mundo*.⁷ The author of this treatise states at the beginning of chapter 6, where his theological discussion starts, that God ‘has been accorded the highest and first place’ and that he is ‘therefore called “ὑπατος”, dwelling, as the Poet says, “on the loftiest crest” of all heaven’.⁸ Here, then, in the text of a treatise passed down under Aristotle’s name, the expression ‘ὑπατος’ is presented as deriving from the tradition.

In any case this offers sufficient grounds for preferring Butterworth’s translation of τὸν καλούμενον ‘ὑπατον’ as ‘he who is called the “Highest”’ to Mondésert’s

⁶ Arist. *M.A.* 4, 700a1, quoting *Il.* 8.20–2.

⁷ Cf. *Aristotele: Trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro*, transl. with Greek text, introd. and comm. by G. Reale (Naples, 1974), who, after P. Gohlke, is the first to defend its authenticity. His position is accepted in A. P. Bos, *Aristoteles, Over de kosmos*, introd., transl., notes (Meppel, 1989); id., ‘Supplementary Notes on the *De mundo*’, *Hermes* 119 (1991), 312–32. A date in the first century B.C. or A.D. is again vigorously defended for the *De mundo* by P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias*, ii (Berlin, 1984), pp. 5–82 and H. B. Gottschalk, ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Century’, in *ANRW*, 36.2 (Berlin, 1987), 1079–1174, pp. 1132–9. For a discussion of their positions see A. P. Bos, ‘Considerazioni sul “De mundo” e analisi critica delle tesi di Paul Moraux’, *Riv. di Filos. Neo-scolastica* 82 (1990), 587–606. An important contribution to the discussion is given in D. M. Schenkeveld, ‘Language and Style of the Aristotelian *De mundo* in Relation to the Question of its Inauthenticity’, *Elenchos* 12 (1991), 221–55. J. Mansfeld, ‘Two attributions’, *CQ* 41 (1991), pp. 541–4; D. Holwerda, ‘Text kritisches und Exegetisches zur pseudo-Aristotelischen Schrift *περι τοῦ κόσμου*’, *Mnemosyne* 46 (1993), pp. 46–53.

⁸ *Mi.* 6, 397b24–27: τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρώτῃν ἔδραν αὐτὸς ἔλαχεν, ὑπατός τε διὰ τοῦτο ὀνόμασται, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν ‘ἀκροτάτη κορυφῆ’ τοῦ σύμπαντος ἐγκαθιδρυμένος οὐρανοῦ.

translation 'celui qu'il appelle "très-haut"'. But the relevant text from *De mundo* 6 has more to contribute, if we ask whether the tradition to which the author refers can be established more precisely. In the text, the words 'on the loftiest crest' are explicitly attributed to the Poet.⁹ Most translators and commentators confine themselves to mentioning *Iliad* 1.499.¹⁰ F. Regen gave preference to *Iliad* 5.754.¹¹ In my opinion, however, it is clear that the author had *Iliad* 8.3 in mind, since the beginning of Book 8 contains a famous speech of Zeus to the other gods, in which he boasts of his supreme power. Even if all the gods and goddesses were to pull on one end of a 'golden cord', they would not be able to move Zeus from his place. This passage has played a very important role in the philosophical literature. In the *Timaeus* Plato, too, used it as the model for the speech that the Demiurge gave to the 'younger' gods.¹² And it is clear that the text has repeatedly been given a philosophical meaning by means of an allegorical explanation.¹³ Plato gives evidence of this in his *Theaetetus*.¹⁴ According to Eustathius, however, the Aristotelian doctrine of the Prime Unmoved Mover in his relation to the seven planetary spheres was also presented as being allegorically alluded to in the Homeric text about 'the golden cord'.¹⁵ On the basis of Eustathius' information one is justified in supposing that Aristotle himself, in his lost writings, made this link between Homer's text and his own philosophical theology. This supposition is supported by the fact that Aristotle quotes three lines from the passage in question in connection with the notion of the Prime Unmoved Mover.¹⁶ A further important piece of evidence is that Theophrastus also quotes a line from the same Homeric context in a critical analysis of Aristotle's theology.¹⁷

I believe that in the text of the *De mundo* we should also place the word *ὑπατος* between quotation marks and that, instead of citing another Homeric passage, we should first of all be thinking of the relevant passage in *Iliad* 8 (line 22).¹⁸ Because it appears that Aristotle used an allegorical interpretation of the famous passage about the 'golden cord' in *Iliad* 8 for his own theology of the Unmoved Mover and the dependence thereon of the planetary spheres, I think that the two casual allusions to the same passage in *De mundo* 6. 397b24–7 strongly suggest that the *De mundo* is an authentic Aristotelian work.¹⁹

⁹ In the small work *De mundo*, G. Reale, op. cit., p. 351, draws attention to eight quotations of Homer. In view of what follows below, I believe there are nine.

¹⁰ Thus W. L. Lorimer; J. Tricot; P. Gohlke; D.-J. Furley; G. Reale, ad loc.

¹¹ F. Regen, 'Die Residenz des persischen Grosskönigs und der Palast des Menelaos', *Hermes* 100 (1972), 206–7. In the text of *Il.* 5 there is a combination of 'the loftiest crest' (754) with 'Zeus, the Highest' (756).

¹² Pl. *Tim.* 41a7ff. Cf. Philo, *Aet.* 13. Philo's reference in ch. 16 to Aristotle's discussion of Plato's views must have been based on Aristotle's lost works (pace R. Arnaldez, ad loc.).

¹³ Cf. P. Lévêque, *Aurea catena Homeri: une étude sur l'allégorie grecque* (Paris, 1959).

¹⁴ Pl. *Th.* 153c9.

¹⁵ Eustathius, *In Hom. Il.* (ed. M. van der Valk, Leiden, ii, 1976), p. 695.2ff. and p. 695.9ff.

¹⁶ Arist. *M.A.* 4, 699b37, where *Il.* 8.21–2 and 20 are quoted: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἐρύσαιτ' ἐξ οὐρανόθεν πεδίονδε | Ζῆν' ὑπατον πάντων, οὐδ' εἰ μάλα πολλὰ κάμοιτε· | πάντες δ' ἐξάπτεσθε θεοὶ πάσαι τε θέωναι (the Homeric text reads Ζῆν' ὑπατον μῆσιωρ' in line 22). Cf. *Aristotle's De motu anim.*, text with transl., comm. and interpretative essays by M. C. Nussbaum (Princeton, 1978), pp. 320–1. Nussbaum sees in this text a veiled polemic with Plato, *Th.* 153c9: in his reference there to 'the golden cord', Plato had disregarded the figure of Zeus, who is central in Homer's picture.

¹⁷ Theophr. *Metaph.* 5b15, quoting *Il.* 8.24.

¹⁸ Line 22 should be preferred to line 31 on account of the reference in Theophrastus. But see also Plut. *Quaest. Plat.* 9.

¹⁹ Cf. A. P. Bos, 'Supplementary Notes', *Hermes* 119 (1991), 326–7.

In Clement's text the words τὸν καλούμενον ὕπατον are to be taken in the sense that Aristotle gives the God who in his view is meant by Homer when the latter speaks about 'Ζεὺς ὕπατος' who sits enthroned on the ἀκροτάτη κορυφή, a place in his own system as well.

We should not, however, unreservedly conclude that Clement or his source drew directly on *De mundo* 6. 397b24–7, as it is obvious that the allegorical explanation of *Iliad* 8 that is indicated by the texts of Theophrastus and Eustathius must have been presented in one of Aristotle's lost works. The *De mundo*, whether it is by Aristotle himself or by a later author, does not pretend to be more than a brief summary of Aristotle's philosophical views.²⁰ But if it is seen that the two references to Homer in *De mundo* 6 are to be taken as allusions to the famous passage in *Iliad* 8, even though they have not been recognized as such by modern scholars hitherto, then this has to be a strong argument in favour of Aristotle's authorship. For a falsifier this kind of method is too subtle!

THE DOCTRINE OF LIMITED PROVIDENCE

I now want to focus on Clement's statement that Aristotle spoke about Providence in a particular way. I have already pointed out that modern scholars like Zeller, Festugière, and Moraux hold that there was no question of divine Providence in the Aristotelian works which have been handed down to us and which are recognized as authentic.²¹ Moreover, there is supposedly no room for such an idea in Aristotle's philosophical system, since Aristotle emphatically denies any *actio ad extra* on God's part.²²

However, there is a broad and strong tradition which does attribute to Aristotle the view which we found in Clement, namely that Aristotle accepted divine Providence for the area extending from the outermost heavenly sphere to the sphere of the Moon, that is to say, for the entire part of the cosmos of which Aristotle has posited that it consisted of a very special, divine fifth element.²³ According to this tradition, divine Providence was not operative in the sublunary sphere.

We find this tradition not only in authors from the early Christian church, but equally in the pagan doxographical tradition of Aëtius:²⁴ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐτ' ἐμψυχον ὄλον δι' ὄλου οὔτε λογικὸν οὔτε νοερὸν οὔτε προνοία διοικούμενον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐράνια τούτων πάντων κοινωνεῖν, σφαίρας γὰρ περιεχεῖν ἐμψύχους καὶ ζωτικὰς, τὰ

²⁰ *Mu.* 6, 397b11–12: εἰ καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, ἀλλ' οὖν γε ὡς εἰς τυπώδη μάθησιν. See also ch. 4, 394a8.

²¹ Cf. notes 3–5 above.

²² Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* A 9. 1074b15–35.

²³ We find this view attributed to Aristotle by Tatian, *Or. adv. Graecos* 2; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 25; Hippolytus, *Ref.* 1.20, 22 and 7.14; Clement, *Strom.* 5.14; Origen, *C. Cels.* 1.21 and 3. 75; Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* XV 5,1; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or.* 27.10; Epiphanius, *Adv. Haer.* 3. 2,9; Theodoretus, *Graec. aff.* 5.77.47 and 6.86.7; Ambrose, *Off.* 1.13.48; Chalcidius, *In Tim.* 248. Cf. A. P. Bos, *Providentia Divina; The Theme of Divine 'pronoia' in Plato and Aristotle* (Assen, 1976), p. 5; D. T. Runia, 'Festugière Revisited' *VC* 43 (1989), 1–34, p. 18.

²⁴ See Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 2.3; Stob. *Ecloga* 1.21. Cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, p. 330. See also Diog. Laertius 5.32: τὸν δὲ θεὸν ἀσώματον ἀπέφανε, ... διατείνειν δ' αὐτοῦ τὴν προνοίαν μέχρι τῶν οὐρανίων καὶ εἶναι ἀκίνητον αὐτόν· τὰ δ' ἐπίγεια κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμπάθειαν οἰκονομεῖσθαι and the commentary of P. Moraux, *Elenchos* 7 (1986), 281. It is striking how easily scholars like Moraux (and before him Festugière) accept that the whole of antiquity took a completely wrong view of matters on such an important subject as the Aristotelian doctrine of divine Providence. For an entirely new analysis of the problem of ancient doxography, see J. Mansfeld, 'Doxography and Dialectic: The *Sitz im Leben* of the "Placita"', in *ANRW* 36.4 (Berlin, 1990), 3057–3229; cf. D. T. Runia, 'Xenophanes on the Moon: A Doxographicum in Aëtius', *Phronesis* 34 (1989), 245–69.

δὲ περίγεια μηδενὸς αὐτῶν, τῆς δ' εὐταξίας κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐ προηγουμένως μετέχειν. According to this tradition, the heavenly beings are endowed with reason and intellectual ability and they fall within the organization of Providence. This is not true of the sublunary sphere as such. It is added that in so far as the sublunary sphere is well ordered, this is at most a side-effect. Evidently only the unchanging order of the movements of the heavenly beings is the direct manifestation of divine Providence.

Now in the Aristotelian Corpus we do find lengthy expositions on the supralunary sphere and the fifth element. But the discussion here remains entirely on the level of the 'natural facts' which can be observed through 'natural experience'. Nowhere in the *De caelo* are the phenomena described there presented as products of ordering or Providence. The presentation must have been very different in the lost work *On Philosophy*, which certainly did not remain restricted within the limits of pure natural philosophy, but also offered a theological discussion.²⁵

But we also find this 'comprehensive' perspective in the surviving treatise *De mundo*. There the order in the heavenly spheres is explained in so many words as the effect of God's 'power', which operates on them in proportion to their proximity to God. That is why the earth and all earthly events seem weak, unharmonious, and full of confusion, because they are farthest removed from the help proceeding from God.²⁶ But the conclusion which this might suggest, that the sublunary sphere is entirely devoid of order, is immediately countered by the author of the *De mundo*:²⁷ 'Nevertheless, in so far as the divine by nature permeates all things and things in our world occur according to what occurs in the [celestial] regions above us, ... it is better to assume ... that the power which has its seat in heaven is the cause of preservation even for those things which are remotest from it ...'. Here we have not only the remarkable statement that 'the divine permeates all things', to which I shall return in due course, but also that the phenomena in the sublunary sphere are a side-effect of the orderly movements in the heavens!²⁸ The report in Aëtius that 'the earthly regions share in sound order not primarily but as a side-effect' seems to go back directly to this, or to the work of which the *De mundo* is a brief summary.²⁹

Finally, it is quite remarkable that the orthodox Aristotelian character of precisely this part of the doxographical tradition and of the *De mundo* is proved by a text of no less an authority than Theophrastus. In chapter 1 of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle's best-known pupil reflects on the possibility of a relationship between the metaphysical Origin and physical reality and then discusses whether this relationship can be

²⁵ Cf. Arist. *Philos.* fr. 26 Ross, fr. 25. 1 Gigon.

²⁶ *Mu.* 6. 397b27–32 (directly after the passage in which God is described as ὕπατος and enthroned on the ἀκροτάτη κορυφή): μάλιστα δὲ πῶς αὐτοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπολαύει τὸ πλησίον αὐτοῦ σῶμα, καὶ ἔπειτα τὸ μετ' ἐκείνο, καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἄχρι τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς τόπων. Διὸ γὰρ τε καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀποστάσει πλείστη τῆς ἐκ θεοῦ ὄντα ὠφελείας, ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀκατάλληλα εἶναι καὶ πολλῆς μεστὰ ταραχῆς. Cf. S. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* (Oxford, 1971), p. 47 with n. 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 397b32–398a4: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον ἐπὶ πάν δικνεῖσθαι πέφυκεν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς ὁμοίως συμβαίνει τὰ τε ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, κατὰ τὸ ἐγγιόν τε καὶ πορρωτέρω θεοῦ εἶναι μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον ὠφελείας μεταλαμβάνοντα, κρείττον οὖν ὑπολαβεῖν, ὃ καὶ πρέπον ἐστὶ καὶ θεῷ μάλιστα ἀρμόζον, ὡς ἡ ἐν οὐρανῷ δύναμις ἰδρυμένη καὶ τοῖς πλείστον ἀφ᾽ ἑστηκόσων, ... αἴτιος γίνεται σωτηρίας, ...

²⁸ With D.-J. Furley I reject the addition of ἐπὶ before τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς by W. L. Lorimer as misleading. Diogenes Laertius 5.32 expresses the same idea as the doxographical tradition in the words: τὰ δ' ἐπίγεια κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμπάθειαν οἰκονομείσθαι.

²⁹ Cf. *Hermes* 119 (1991), 327–8, where I argue that the passage τῆς δ' εὐταξίας κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐ προηγουμένως μετέχειν in the doxographical testimony indicates the right way to read *Mu.* 6. 397b33: καὶ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς ὁμοίως συμβαίνει τὰ τε ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς.

thought to consist in a *dynamis* proceeding from the Origin.³⁰ Because Theophrastus is undoubtedly dealing with the theological theories of his teacher here, he thus gives strong support to the soundly Aristotelian character of the doctrine of divine *dynamis* in chapter 6 of the *De mundo*. Moreover, Theophrastus elaborates on this in the sense that the *dynamis* is perhaps to be conceived of as the cause of a desire which motivates the outermost heavenly sphere. The divine power is apparently a kind of ‘power of attraction’. Reflecting further on this cosmic ‘desire’ as the effect of the divine *dynamis*, he also asks why it only operates (directly) on the heavenly beings which move in a circle. In this way Theophrastus clearly indicates that, according to Aristotle, the relationship of the Original Principle with the divine heavenly beings of the ethereal sphere is a direct relationship, in contrast to that with the sublunary sphere.

Strikingly, Theophrastus goes on to argue that this cannot be explained by saying that ‘the Original Principle does not penetrate’ into the sublunary sphere.³¹ This seems to link up directly with the remark in *De mundo* 6. 397b32: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὅσον ἐπὶ πᾶν δεικνέσθαι πέφυκεν τὸ θεῖον. And this connection with the theology of the *De mundo* is reinforced when Theophrastus rejects the idea that the Original Principle is limited in its effect with reference to *Iliad* 8.24, from the context of the ‘golden cord’ passage.

On the basis of this text in Theophrastus, one is justified in stating that:

- (a) the doctrine of divine *dynamis* in *De mundo* 6 is soundly Aristotelian;³²
- (b) the doctrine of a divine Providence which is limited to the sphere of the Moon is soundly Aristotelian, and is identical with the theory in the *De mundo* that the order in the heavenly spheres is the result of the effect of divine *dynamis*, while the sublunary sphere is less well ordered and sometimes chaotic because the order there is merely derivative and secondary in nature;³³
- (c) that the doxographical tradition about Aristotle’s doctrine of limited Providence as found in Pseudo-Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Stobaeus ultimately goes back to Theophrastus’ own interpretation of the Aristotelian texts.

Finally, one might note that the phrasing of Clement’s *μέχρι τῆς σελήνης αὐτῆς διορίζων τὴν προνοίαν* recalls another passage from the *De mundo*, where the last planet mentioned in a list of the planets is ὁ τῆς σελήνης (sc. κύκλος), *μέχρις ἧς ὀρίζεται ὁ αἰθῆρ*.³⁴

IS IT POSSIBLE THAT ARISTOTLE PRESENTED THE ‘HIGHEST (GOD)’ AS THE SOUL OF THE WORLD?

This already goes a long way towards exculpating Clement of the charge which could be brought against him as a witness with regard to Greek philosophy. But that is not to say that a complete acquittal can follow. For we still have to contend with the fact that Clement also makes a statement about Aristotle’s philosophy which neither can be verified in the extant work, nor is supported by the remains of the lost works, nor

³⁰ Theophr. *Metaph.* 1.4, 4b14; 1.5, 5a1.

³¹ Theophr. *Metaph.* 5b13: ὡς οὐ δεικνυμένου τοῦ πρώτου.

³² Contrary to what P. Moraux, op. cit. (1984), pp. 41–4 claims.

³³ It is remarkable that Apuleius, *De mundo* 24 translates the Greek words *δυνάμει χρώμενος ἀτρυτῶ* (6. 397b23) as ‘quodam infatigabili providentia’. Elsewhere he uses ‘potestas’ for *δύναμις*.

³⁴ *Mu.* 2. 392a29. It is noteworthy that the explanation for the presence of the order (τάξις) in the ethereal sphere posited in ch. 2, 392a32 is not given until the theological sixth chapter, 397b27–30, by means of the doctrine of divine *dynamis*.

is corroborated by any author from the doxographical tradition. I am referring to his statement that Aristotle thinks 'that he who is called the "Highest" is the soul of the universe; that is to say, he supposes the soul of the world to be God'.³⁵ Must we conclude that Clement has committed a huge blunder here?

We can start by observing that in any case we should not take Clement to be attributing pantheism to Aristotle. He had attributed this position to the Stoics in the immediately preceding section and he had derided them for claiming that divinity pervades all matter, even the most inferior.³⁶ The fact that Aristotle's view is placed between those of the Stoa and Epicurus indicates that Clement is more interested in differences in philosophical systems than in historical development, as is also the case in the doxographical tradition of the *Placita*.³⁷ In Pseudo-Plutarch's *Placita* three positions are summed up under the heading 'Is the cosmos ensouled and guided by Providence?':

1. the position that the (entire) cosmos is ensouled and guided by Providence;
2. the position of the Atomists, such as Democritus and Epicurus, who deny altogether that the cosmos is ensouled or guided by Providence;

and as an intermediate position between these two extremes:

3. Aristotle's view, which rejects the ensouled nature of the cosmos and its government by Providence, but accepts these for the heavenly spheres.³⁸

Doubtless Clement, too, presented Aristotle as accepting that the supralunary part of the cosmos is ensouled. But now he seems to posit that Aristotle identified the soul which pervades the supralunary part of the cosmos with the 'Highest (God)'. Clement thus seems to be the *only* explicit witness to a philosophical conception which has very often been attributed to Aristotle, not on the basis of Clement's testimony, but *on the basis of an aprioristically constructed development in Aristotle's thought!*

I am referring to the conception of an *immanent philosophy* or *cosmic theology*. Such a conception has been attributed to Aristotle by highly renowned scholars such as von Arnim, Guthrie, Festugière, and Pépin. But it is merely the result of modern scholarly efforts to overcome certain problems discovered in Aristotle's works. One of these problems is the fact that in *De caelo* 1 the fifth element is said to move eternally in a circle *by virtue of its own nature*, whereas in other texts the movement of the heavenly spheres is explained by the theory of a Prime Unmoved Mover. Some present-day interpreters have subsequently posited that the rejection of Plato's doctrine of Ideas led Aristotle to reject the notion of transcendence altogether. For the early independent-minded Aristotle, the ether supposedly became the highest divine entity. Only later was this purely cosmic theology given greater depth through the doctrine of an Unmoved, transcendent Mover.³⁹

³⁵ Clem. *Protr.* 5.66.4: τὸν καλούμενον ὕπατον ψυχὴν εἶναι τοῦ πάντος οἰεται· τουτέστι τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ψυχὴν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάναν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ περιπέριται.

³⁶ Clem. *Protr.* 5.66.3: οὐδὲ μὴν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στωᾶς παρελεύσομαι διὰ πάσης ὕλης καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγοντας, οἱ καταισχύνοσιν ἀτεχνῶς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν.

³⁷ A forthcoming joint study on the doxographical tradition by J. Mansfeld and D. T. Runia will strongly emphasize this systematic approach. See also their preliminary studies mentioned above (n. 24).

³⁸ Ps.-Plut. *Placita* 2.3.

³⁹ Cf. H. von Arnim, 'Die Entstehung der Gotteslehre des Aristoteles', *SB Akad. W. Wien* 212.5 (1931), 3–80; repr. in F. P. Hager, *Metaphysik und Theologie des Aristoteles* (Darmstadt, 1969), 1–74; W. K. C. Guthrie, 'The Development of Aristotle's Theology', *CQ* 27 (1933), 162–72; 28 (1934), 90–8; J. Moreau, *L'Âme du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens* (Paris, 1939; Hildesheim, 1965²), p. 122; A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, ii (Paris, 1949), pp. 221, 245, 258–9; J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne* (Paris, 1964), p. 171: 'Le dialogue *De philosophia* professait une théologie cosmique assez élaborée.' Cf. also J. M. Rist, *The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophical Growth* (Toronto, 1989), p. 15:

However, this powerful tradition of modern Aristotelian scholarship cannot base its claims on any cut-and-dried evidence in the texts. Instead it is continually forced to remove certain passages on the grounds that they are 'later additions'. Furthermore, if these interpreters talk about an immanence theology in Aristotle at all, it is not in the sense of a doctrine about God as the World-soul, but of God as cosmic Mind. It must be said, however, this interpretative tradition is highly vulnerable, since it separates Aristotle's introduction of the new theory of ether from his polemic against Plato's dialectical theology.⁴⁰

So we have to conclude that it seems difficult to make sense of Clement's statement about the identification of the 'Highest (God)' with the World-soul.

An additional factor is that while the text from Clement's *Protrepticus* is the only hard evidence for a form of immanence theology in Aristotle, Clement apparently also knew that Aristotle presented transcendence of the cosmos and of nature as the ultimate goal of philosophy! For in Book 1 of his *Stromateis*, where he describes the division of Moses' philosophy, that is to say, an outline of what he regards as biblical and Christian philosophy, Clement distinguishes four parts, the highest part being described as *epopteia*, 'contemplation', which goes beyond natural philosophy and is to be referred to as 'theology'. This part, Clement goes on to say, was recognized by Plato, but also by Aristotle, who calls it 'metaphysics'.⁴¹ It seems inconsistent that an author who identified the World-soul with the 'Highest (God)' should simultaneously have developed a doctrine of a transcendent, metaphysical reality.

A further peculiarity of our text from the *Protrepticus* is that the words 'he who is called the "Highest"' seem to establish a strong link with *De mundo* 6. 397b25, even though this passage is part of an argument claiming that the 'Highest (God)' should *not* be taken to be immanent in the cosmos. For only God's power (*dynamis*) is immanent in the cosmos. His being (*ousia*), on the other hand, is transcendent.⁴² Sure enough, God can be called 'the central pivot' of the entire cosmos, in the sense of 'the command centre', but by no means should he be located in the spatial centre of the cosmos. God is too elevated above all impurity and unordered movement for this.⁴³ No one who has read chapter 6 of the *De mundo* can conclude that the author presents God merely as the World-soul which is immanent in the heavenly spheres. The distinction between God's being and his power is too fundamental for such an interpretation. But one *can* say that the author of the *De mundo* regards God as both *transcendent* with regard to the world and *immanent* in it.

Aristotle's dialogue *De philosophia* 'denies a transcendent God and identifies the highest principle of the cosmos with an immanent World-mind'; and D. T. Runia, art. cit. (1989), p. 19. This view was still held in A. P. Bos, *On the Elements: Aristotle's Early Cosmology* (Assen, 1972) and id., *Providentia divina* (Assen, 1976).

⁴⁰ See A. P. Bos, *Cosmic and Meta-cosmic Theology in Aristotle's Lost Dialogues* (Leiden, 1989), p. 92, where it is pointed out that the criticism of Plato's doctrine of the creation of the world by a divine Demiurge in Aristotle's *De philosophia* must have gone together with criticism of the doctrine of the World-soul in the *Timaeus*, and that Aristotle's alternative of an uncreated and imperishable world suggested the notion of the divine fifth element, which took the place of the Platonic World-soul. For the actualization of its intellectual capacity, however, this divine substance was believed by Aristotle to be dependent on the effect of the pure, highest Intellect.

⁴¹ Clem. *Strom.* 1.28.176: ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Μωυσῆα φιλοσοφία τετραχῆ τέμνεται, εἰς τε τὸ ἱστορικὸν καὶ τὸ κυρίως λεγόμενον νομοθετικόν, ἅπερ ἂν εἴη τῆς ἠθικῆς πραγματείας ἴδια, τὸ τρίτον δὲ εἰς τὸ ἱεραργικόν, ὃ ἐστὶν ἤδη τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας· καὶ τέταρτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι τὸ θεολογικὸν εἶδος, ἡ ἐποπτεία, ἣν φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων τῶν μεγάλων ὄντων εἶναι μυστηρίων, Ἄριστοτέλης δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ καλεῖ. E. A. Clarke, *Clement's Use of Aristotle* (New York, 1977), p. 68, points out that Clement seems unaware that the title 'Metaphysics' does not originate from Aristotle himself.

⁴² *Mu.* 6. 397b16–24.

⁴³ *Mu.* 6. 400a3–9. Cf. 398a11–35.

It is also striking that the *De mundo* draws a comparison between God and the soul of human beings. Just as the soul of man is invisible, but its effects in the life and actions of human beings are clearly visible, so God, too, is invisible to all mortal men, but perceptible through his effects.⁴⁴ We shall have to return to this passage. It certainly would have been helpful if the *De mundo* had made it clear whether the author conceived of the human soul in the Platonic sense, as has been sometimes suggested on the basis of what is said in chapter 1 about the ascent of the soul under the guidance of the intellect to the heavenly regions,⁴⁵ or whether he was already moving in the direction of the psychology of Aristotle's *De anima*. But the author of the *De mundo* in chapter 4 sets aside the whole problem of the soul, even if he does tell us that psychology should also deal with the plants and that he also regards the notion of *pneuma* as being relevant here!⁴⁶

As for Aristotle's lost works, the remains of these have more than once been interpreted as supporting the hypothesis of a phase in Aristotle's development in which he defended a purely cosmic theology. The discussion has focused on the famous passage in Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.13.33, where the Epicurean Velleius accuses Aristotle of confusion and internal contradictions in his theology: 'For now he ascribes all divinity to mind, now he says the world itself is a god, now he sets another god over the world and ascribes to him the role of ruling and preserving the movement of the world by a sort of backward rotation. Then he says the heat of the heavens is a god ...' (translated by W. D. Ross).⁴⁷ Elsewhere I have given extensive consideration to this text and the modern debate about it and have concluded that Cicero's text, too, presents the Aristotelian doctrine of a metaphysical, transcendent Intellect as the highest divine authority.⁴⁸

But what about the information which the rest of the doxographical tradition gives us about Aristotle's theology? In the *Placita* we find: 'Aristotle regards the highest God as an *eidos choriston*, mounted on the sphere of the universe, this sphere being the element ether, which he calls the fifth.'⁴⁹ In Diogenes Laertius we have the statement: 'He maintained, like Plato, that God is incorporeal. And that his Providence extended to the heavenly beings, but that he himself was unmoved.'⁵⁰ In the Christian author Athenagoras, on the other hand, we find the information:

⁴⁴ *Mu.* 6. 399b10–19. Cf. b14: καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ, δι' ἣν ζῶμεν τε καὶ οἴκους καὶ πόλεις ἔχομεν, ἀόρατος οὐσα τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς ὁράται... b19: Ταῦτα χρῆ καὶ περὶ θεοῦ διανοεῖσθαι... διότι πασῇ θνητῇ φύσει γενόμενος ἀθεώρητος ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται.

⁴⁵ *Mu.* 1. 391a11–16.

⁴⁶ Cf. *Mu.* 4. 394b9–12: λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως πνεῦμα ἢ τε ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις [καὶ] διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἔμφυχός τε καὶ γόνιμος οὐσία, περὶ ἧς νῦν λέγειν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. Cf. *Hermes* 119 (1991), 321–4.

⁴⁷ Cic. *N.D.* 1.13.33 = Arist. *De philo.* fr. 26 Ross, 25. 1 Gigon: Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone dissentiens. modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur. tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse quem alio loco ipse designarit deum.

⁴⁸ A. P. Bos, *Cosmic and Meta-cosmic Theology*, pp. 185–200.

⁴⁹ Ps.-Plut. *Placita* 1.7.881e: 'Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν εἶδος χωριστόν, ἐπιβεβηκότα τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοῦ πάντος, ἧτις ἐστὶν αἰθέριον σῶμα, τὸ πέμπτον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλούμενον. In the parallel text from Stobaeus < χωριστόν > is lacking, but it adds ὁμοίως Πλάτωνι. In the preceding section Ps.-Plut. had noted for Plato: νοῦς οὖν ὁ θεός, χωριστόν εἶδος. τούτεστι τὸ ἀμυγες πάσης ὕλης καὶ μηδενὶ παθητῶ συμπεπλεγμένον. Cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, pp. 304–5; J. Péripin, *Théologie cosmique*, pp. 159–60, who believes this text echoes Aristotle's *De philosophia*.

⁵⁰ Diog. Laert. 5.32: τὸν δὲ θεὸν ἀσώματον ἀπέφαινε καθὰ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων, διατείνειν δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν προνοίαν μέχρι τῶν οὐρανίων καὶ εἶναι ἀκίνητον αὐτόν. See P. Moraux, *Elenchos* 7 (1986), 281.

‘Aristotle and his school bring before us one God whom they liken to a composite living being and say that he consists of soul and body. They consider his body to be the ether, the planets and the sphere of the fixed stars, all of which have a circular motion, and his soul to be the reason that controls the motion of the body – itself unmoved, yet cause of the body’s motion’ (transl. W. R. Schoedel).⁵¹

The texts cited here show that the tradition of the *Placita* and of Diogenes Laertius clearly points in the direction of Aristotle’s theology of a First Unmoved Mover that is transcendent in relation to the ether. Their information about Aristotle is entirely consonant with the conception that we encountered in chapter 6 of the *De mundo*.

In the case of Athenagoras, matters are somewhat different. But he, too, thinks it important to state that God is the *logos* which, unmoved itself, causes the movement of the heavenly spheres. Athenagoras does bring up the notion of ‘soul’ in his discussion of Aristotle’s theology, but only as the soul of the body that is formed by the ethereal spheres, the soul which moves that body without being moved itself.

We can conclude, therefore, that neither the surviving works of Aristotle nor the fragments of his lost works nor the treatise *De mundo* nor the doxographical tradition lends support to the hypothesis that Aristotle defended an immanent theology or purely cosmic theology in any phase of his philosophical career. All the available sources and traditions, with the single exception of Clement, draw a distinction between God and the ethereal sphere, in that they emphasize the fact that God is unmoved, *choristos*, or immaterial. At the same time they posit a very special relationship between God and the ether, inasmuch as they present God as the mover of the ether or as provident with regard to the ether or as a principle which acts on the ether with its *dynamis*.

In the face of so many witnesses whose testimony, though differently phrased, is unanimous, Clement’s testimony cannot possibly be interpreted as representing an entirely distinct and otherwise entirely unknown and unattested tradition. This raises the question: is there any way we can remove the apparent discrepancy between Clement of Alexandria’s account and the further tradition?

I believe there is, namely by taking Clement’s statement that Aristotle identified the ‘Highest (God)’ with the ‘soul of the universe’ as meaning that Aristotle presented the ‘Highest (God)’ as ‘the soul of the universe’ in an Aristotelian sense, that is to say, as the ‘first entelechy’ of the fifth element! It is this specific Aristotelian psychology as we know it from the *De anima* which is attributed to Aristotle in the doxography of Diogenes Laertius immediately after the theological position quoted above: ‘[Aristotle] also maintained the soul to be incorporeal: it is the first entelechy of a natural organic body which potentially possesses life. He speaks of “entelechy” with regard to that which has an incorporeal *eidōs*.’⁵² I suggest, therefore, that

⁵¹ Athenag. *Leg.* 6.3: ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἔνα ἄγοντες οἰοῦναι ζῶν ἄσθητον, ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστηκότα λέγουσι τὸν θεόν, σῶμα μὲν αὐτοῦ τὸ αἰθέριον νομιζόντες τοὺς τε πλανωμένους ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν σφαῖραν τῶν ἀπλανῶν κινούμενα κυκλοφορητικῶς, ψυχὴν δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει τοῦ σώματος λόγον, αὐτὸν μὲν οὐ κινούμενον, αἴτιον δὲ τῆς τούτου κινήσεως γινόμενον. G. Bardy notes in *Athénagore, Supplique au sujet des chrétiens* (Paris, 1943), p. 85 n. 2: ‘En réalité ce n’est pas la doctrine d’Aristote qui est ici exposée mais celle du *Du monde*’, with reference to A. J. Festugière, *L’Idéal religieux*. But W. R. Schoedel notes in *Athenagoras, Legatio and De Resurrectione*, ed. and transl. (Oxford, 1972), p. 15 n. 3: ‘Possibly derived from Aetius, *Plac.* 1.7.32; but it is more likely that Athenagoras reflects the early (Platonizing) Aristotle here (G. Lazzati, *L’Aristotele perduto e gli antichi scrittori cristiani* (Milan, 1938), pp. 69–72; cf. Aetius, *Plac.* 5.20.1)’. Cf. also J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique*, p. 159.

⁵² Diog. Laert. 5.32–3: καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ ἀσώματος, ἐντελέχειαν οὖσαν τὴν πρώτην σώματος [γὰρ] φυσικοῦ καὶ ὀργανικοῦ δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος. λέγει δ’ ἐντελέχειαν, ἧς ἔστιν εἶδος τι ἀσώματος. On the problems connected with this passage, see P. Moraux, *Elenchos 7*

Clement or his source posited an analogy between the relation of the soul to the body of an individual living being and the relation between God and the whole ethereal sphere.

Taken in this way, Clement's testimony offers a remarkable indication of the convergence between Aristotle's new psychology of the *entelechy* as an independently existing principle of Form which has a guiding effect on the material principle, and his theology! And perhaps we can also suppose that this convergence is present in the aforementioned text in *De mundo* 6, 399b10–22.⁵³

The 'Highest (God)' was conceived of by Aristotle as the *telos* of all natural reality. As an eternally actual Mind, this 'Highest (God)' is also the principle which eternally actualizes the potential for intellectuality of the divine heavenly beings. The intellect of beings who are not pure intellectuality, such as human beings, but equally that of the heavenly beings, requires a higher principle, which as an *intellectus agens* actualizes this potential intellect.⁵⁴ God, who is that higher principle, might in this sense have been said to be the entelechy of the cosmos.

Aristotle, who levelled fundamental criticism at Plato's psychology for failing to differentiate between kinds of souls on the basis of the level of life realized by a soul,⁵⁵ distinguished three levels himself, to wit the 'anima vegetativa', the 'anima sensitiva', and the 'anima rationalis'. But to realize the goal of the 'anima rationalis' Aristotle postulated a single metaphysical entelechy: the divine Intellect, as *eidōs choriston*. It may be conceded that human beings always remain human beings and that heavenly beings will always continue to complete their orbits. From that point of view Alexander of Aphrodisias could say that the first heaven only strives to become as like as possible to the transcendent God, not to reach him.⁵⁶ However, in so far as their intellectual potentiality is being actualized by the eternally actual transcendent Intellect, they transcend their physical condition and realize their metaphysical *eidōs*.

THE COSMOS REFERRED TO AS 'GOD' BY ARISTOTLE

We still have to pay brief attention to the fourth view which Clement ascribes to Aristotle, namely that he regards the cosmos as a god.⁵⁷ We do not find this doctrine in the surviving Aristotelian treatises either,⁵⁸ nor in the *De mundo*. But it is a doctrine which Cicero, too, explicitly attributes to Aristotle and locates in the third book of the work *De philosophia*.⁵⁹ In his discussion of this text, Jaeger had hypothesized that in the dialogue concerned Aristotle had used the term *kosmos* in the sense of 'heaven' and that the Epicurean had misunderstood this.⁶⁰ If Jaeger were right, Clement, too,

(1986), pp. 282ff. Various corruptions must have taken place in this doxographical passage of Diogenes Laertius. However, Moraux does date it to an earlier period than the commentaries on Aristotle's treatises. The author's original intention must have been to say something like: λέγει δ' ἐντελέγειαν εἶδος τι ἀσώματων... (art. cit., p. 285).⁵³ Cf. n. 44 above.

⁵⁴ Cf. Arist. *Anim.* 3.5, *Metaph.* 2.1, 993b9–11.

⁵⁵ Cf. Arist. *Anim.* 1.3, 407b12–26. See also Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 4.2–7. Cf. J. C. M. van Winden, *An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho Chapters One to Nine* (Leiden, 1971).⁵⁶ Alex. of Aphrod. *Aporiae* 1.25, p. 40.17 (ed. I. Bruns).

⁵⁷ Clem. *Protr.* 5.66.4: τὸν κόσμον θεὸν ἡγοούμενος.

⁵⁸ Cf. J. Pépin, 'Cosmic Piety', in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality; Egyptian, Greek, Roman* (New York, 1986), pp. 408–35, p. 413: 'In his best-known works, which arise from his teaching as head of a school, Aristotle leaves no room even for the possibility of a religion of the world. But probably it was not always so.'

⁵⁹ Cic., *N.D.* 1.13.33 = Arist. *Philos.* fr. 26 Ross; 25.1 Gigon. Cf. n. 47 above.

⁶⁰ W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Oxford, 1948), p. 139. Cf. A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, ii.244 n. 4.

would obviously have erred in claiming that Aristotle called the cosmos (including the sublunary sphere) 'god'. But Pépin has rightly rejected Jaeger's hypothesis,⁶¹ since Philo also ascribes to Aristotle the view that the entire visible world is a 'visible god'.⁶² And we are told in the doxographical tradition, too, that Aristotle regarded the cosmos as *ἐνθεος*.⁶³

We can therefore assume that in the extensive refutation of Plato's theory of the creation of the world which the *De philosophia* must have contained, Aristotle called the cosmos as a whole 'god'. We can probably also assume that, just as Plato called the visible cosmos 'god', because he regarded it as animate and, owing to the World-soul, endowed with intellectual capability, so Aristotle took the divinity of the cosmos as being due to its divine component, the ether, which possesses intellectuality and rationality owing to its relation with the transcendent, Highest God.

The difference in the terminology used by Aristotle might be explained here too by pointing out that the treatises of the Corpus confine themselves to the 'natural', immanent perspective of physics, whereas the *De philosophia* tried to offer a more comprehensive perspective, namely that of theology.⁶⁴

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⁶¹ J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique*, p. 146 with n. 2. Cf. E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* (Padua, 1962), p. 378 with n. 230.

⁶² Philo, *Aet.* 3.10 = Arist. *Philos.* fr. 18 Ross and Philo, *Aet.* 5.20 = Arist. *Philos.* fr. 19a Ross. Cf. J. Pépin, 'Cosmic Piety', pp. 413–14.

⁶³ Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 1.43.1 = Arist. *Philos.* fr. 22 Ross.

⁶⁴ I would like to acknowledge my gratitude for the stimulating criticism of a draft version of this article which I received from my colleagues D. M. Schenkeveld and D. T. Runia of the Free University, Amsterdam and J. C. M. van Winden of the State University of Leiden, and from an anonymous referee of the *CQ*. The final version was realized during a study leave spent at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Wassenaar in 1991–2.